In this essay, I will discuss the fundamental structural and rhetorical differences between first-and third-person narration that Mauriac's protagonists disclose. This differential relationship between the two narrative voices provides a preliminary answer to one of the major questions being posed by modern criticism. Are distinctions between first-and third-person narration significant? Therese Desqueyroux and Le Noeud de viperes confirm Gerard Genette's statement that the choice of either voice is in itself arbitrary.' But both novels provide strong evidence that transitions between first-and third-person narration are not at all arbitrary. This evidence is produced when Mauriac redirects his protagonists' comments on voice back on his own transitions between first-and thirdperson narration. These transitions are in fact quite dramatic. In Therese Desqueyroux, the omniscient narrator gradually hides his third-person voice behind the first-person voice of his heroine's inner monologue, but at a critical point replaces her first-person narration with his third-person narration. In Le Noeud de viperes, Louis's firstperson diary gives way, after his death, to third-person accounts of his life. Through his protagonists, Mauriac reveals that the transition from first-to third-person narration is significantly different from the reverse transition. Each plays a distinct role in the overall textual structure that discloses the absence of the author from his text. And only together can they uncover Mauriac's profound ambivalence as to what the absence of his Christian point of view might mean.
I. Narrative Structure as Narrative Law
Although Therese Desqueyroux and Le Noeud de viperes both question any link between narrative voice and point of view, Therese concentrates on the structural differences between first-and thirdperson narration that generate her questions, whereas Louis develops the rhetorical implications of these differences. Therese begins to question the relationship between narrative voice and point of view when she tries to replace a patently false, third-person story of her life with an authentic, first-person one. She is upset with the fictional account of her life that her father and lawyer have constructed in order to protect the family reputation. They wish to destroy all traces of her 2 Literature, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1987] , Art. 2 http://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol11/iss2/2 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1195 apparent attempt to poison her husband. Were the true story to be known, or, worse yet, were it to be told in the local newspapers, her husband's family name would be tarnished and her father's political career ruined. In order to prevent that outcome, they plan to do everything possible to convince the public that the story of her crime is a fiction. Her father thus proposes to use his political influence so that the Sunday newspaper will entitle the article on her aborted trial "A Scandalous Rumor" (TD, p. 7). 4 To bolster the illusion that she has been slandered, he tells his daughter that she and the husband she almost killed must act like an adoring couple "til death do you part" ( TD, p. 12). In this way, he creates a fictional story of his daughter's conjugal bliss that falsifies a significant part of her past life and dictates all her future actions. It reduces her to a pre-defined role within a fictional sequence of events. "I L]ike someone threatened with suffocation" (TD, p. 8), she experiences it as an attempt to destroy her individuality and freedom.
Studies in 20th & 21st Century
Therese's sense of being suffocated by her father's story is her first step towards realizing that her actions have always been constrained by a more general family story. Her attempt to understand this constraint leads her to disclose the formal nature of this story. by honor and political ambition, the family story is a conventional, shared myth that dictates the acceptable mode of behavior to which respectable family members must adapt. Its strict criteria give each member's life an acceptable order and direction by distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate goals: men go hunting and oversee the property, women remain faithful and bear children, etc. Not only does the family story dictate actions, it also dictates thoughts, in particular, the motivations that perpetuate it: "all my thoughts, till that moment, had been . . . 'fitted to the road' that my father and my parents-in-law had traced" ( TD, p. 65). Like the local carts, all built with an identical wheel base to fit the ruts in the local roads, her thoughts and actions have been molded by the family story to fit a "shared destiny" (TD, p. 93).
When Therese criticizes the family story, she presumes that it has a unified plot similar to the one that Aristotle finds in tragedy. For Aristotle, a tragic plot, as opposed to an epic plot, is constituted by a sequence whose order and direction give an inner unity to the actions and events it recounts. This inner coherence is recognized only retrospectively, at the end of the plot, and is based on a notion of probability or necessity. Probability or necessity are in turn decided by opinion.' A proper plot thus gives actions a socially acceptable "telos," a destiny. Similarly, Therese's family believes that its story has a strict order that defines a common destiny, although, unlike Aristotle, it would prefer to eliminate all dramatic reversals of fortune or recognitions of hidden truths. Yet like Aristotle, it believes that the order of events recounted in its story imitates a probable or necessary order of actions in the real lives of its members. Moreover, it bases this belief on opinion, in this case a mutual agreement that the story accurately represents the destiny of all members. For the family, as for Aristotle, the process of imitation involves an adaptation of family history to a conventionally acceptable order: it is a process of "plot-making," of constructing a story that will persuade the public as well as themselves. "For the sake of the family the world must suppose that we are in complete harmony," her husband tells her (TD, p. 93). Even though this artificial act of constructing a plot suppresses all events that contradict its chosen beginning, middle, and end, the family does not seem to think that it might produce a purely fictional story with no significant relationship to real or probable family history. Thus, although family members know they are lying about Therese's specific crime, they feel that they are doing so in order to protect the sequence that represents the overall family destiny, a sequence that her crime might lead others to misunderstand. They feel that their plot imitates a necessary, underlying reality when, in fact, it actively constructs reality. However, Therese, whose life is being repressed by the family's plot-making, is acutely aware that it is primarily a means of persuasion, not revelation.
The family builds on the Aristotelian notion of a unified plot by adding a crucial distinction between narrative voices. Bernard drums into Therese that the family story is strictly a third-person story. The ideal family member is not interested in the actions of an "I," a "you" or a "we": "I am out of the picture" (TD, p. 93), he Not only must all members act in a manner that makes this story appear true, they must also pass the family story line on from generation to generation. Within the family, the proper name refers to a very specific role, an inherited act of narration. Therese's father and husband are narrators who constantly remind those inside and outside the family of its destiny as wealthy, respectable landowners. Their acts of narration are impersonal, since they simply repeat the story they have inherited. But they are not passive, for they involve a repression of all words or actions that might give rise to contradictory accounts of their destiny: "the best thing would be for Therese to disappear altogether. . . . People would quickly get out of the way of talking about her" (TD, p. 123). Since Therese's statements rewrite the family story and since her actions, in particular her crime, invite others to do so, she threatens to reveal that the family heritage consists of a deceitful act of plot-making. Its historical continuity is provided less by inherited physical actions or character traits than by a third-person act of narration.
It might be objected that Therese is only speaking about one particular act of third-person narration, the family's. designates narrative as a process of constructing and demystifying plot, not as a simple presentation of plot, just as Therese alternately forgets and remembers that she is constructing a fictional story of her husband's life. But this process of narrative differentiation raises the possibility that her first-person narration might reflect a hidden becoming that made her real-life actions different: first-person narration might have an authenticity independent of plot. After all, is not her act of narration closer to her actions, thoughts, and desires than is her family's?
Therese bases her notion of authentic, first-person narration on the theories of a young idealist, Jean Azevedo. Jewish, tubercular, and intellectual, Jean is an outcast from Bordeaux society. Moreover, he has openly rebelled against its constraints. Not long before Therese began to poison her husband, Jean told her how her rebelliousness and impulsiveness fragmented the order that Bernard, with her complicity, was imposing on her life. This fragmentation, he said, uncovered the unique direction of her life. Certain privileged individuals, he stated, had an "individual destiny" ( TD, p. 69) that distinguished their lives from the "shared destiny" of most men (TD*, p. 93). These rare, free individuals followed their unique destiny by refusing to make their actions or thoughts conform to society's predetermined plots and by surrendering themselves to a mystical, inner force: "we were not free to choose the subject of our conversations, or even of our thoughts. . . . People like us always float with the current, go where the slope leads . . ." (TD, p. 66). If Jean is right, then Therese can explain to her husband why she began to poison him only if she can teach him to reject the directed sequence dictated by the family story. He must learn to sense the direction hidden in her fragmented and undirected narrative of her past actions. Her first-person narrative must demystify the plots it constructs, thus resembling the narratives later constructed by some of the new novelists. For a moment, Therese can believe that the "I" is not only a reference to the arbitrariness of narrative plot-construction, but also a sign of closeness between her narrative and the ineffable becoming of its author's life. It appears to be infinitely superior to the "she" of the family story. The third-person pronoun becomes a sign of a blind effort to reduce narrative to a unified plot that misrepresents characters and author.
Mauriac finds an ingenious way of showing that Therese's comments on third-and first-person narration also apply to the omniscient First-person, "authentic" narration cannot accurately represent an author's actions any more than third-person narration can truthfully represent someone else's. Neither voice is a sign of the closeness of its narrative to the life narrating or the life narrated. Rather, both indirectly refer to a distance between narrative and life. In Therese Desqueyroux, third-person narration becomes a reminder of the distance between its plot and the life it claims to order, whereas first-person narration becomes a reminder of the distance between the act of narration and the life of the author. Both voices come to refer to the formal nature of narration: the third-person to the artificial nature of the plots that narrative constructs and the first-person to the artificial nature of the process by which narrative demystifies its plots. Therese's search for a truthful voice only unveils the absence of her life from any third-or first-person narration. Neither voice can protect her from her husband's wrath.
Therese's first major insight is that she is in a world of narrative. She and her family are incapable of reflecting upon life without reducing it to the formal plots of the family story of adaptation or Jean's story of differentiation. When they talk to each other or to themselves, they do not compare perceptions or thoughts; they compare stories. Consciousness of others or of oneself is mediated by the fictional characters and authors that these stories create. The prison to which Therese returns is a world of intersecting stories, characters, and implied authors, a prison-house of narratives.
Through Therese, the omniscient narrator of Therese Desqueyroux designates himself as a fictional, implied author. His discourse invents his character's thoughts and actions or the becoming of the real author's thoughts in the same way that the family invents Therese's life or Therese invents the becoming of her life. Mauriac Immediately after Therese realizes that her transition from thirdto first-person narration has tricked her, Mauriac's third-person narrator "reappears" and recounts her story for her. This return to overt third-person narration can only mean that the narrator accepts his character's conclusions that first-person narration is a covert form of third-person narration. It is certainly not a sign of a return to the illusion that the third-person voice is objective." Rather, when Therese rejects Jean's story of differentiation, she affirms that first-person narration misrepresents the life of the "I" in the same way that thirdperson narration misrepresents the life of a "she," by confusing it with a conventional plot. The "I" is as estranged from the life of the author as the "he" is from the life of someone else. As subject and object of the same utterance, the "I" is a form of third-person narration. When Therese says "this story, constructed all too well, had no link to reality" ( TD, p. 135), she affirms that the character in her first-person narrative is not herself, that it is someone else, a "she." Through his heroine, Therese Desqueyroux's third-person narrator thus substantiates Gerard Genette's important point that neither first-nor thirdperson voices necessarily imply truthful modes of narration.
The narrator's return to third-person narration is a sign that he accepts Therese's conclusion that she is caught in a world of interweaving stories. It also reverses the relationship between voice and narrative. Whereas we usually assume that the choice of first-or third-person narration confers certain qualities on the narrative, it is in fact narrative that creates the illusion that a particular voice is objective or authentic. Although the family believes that third-person narration increases objectivity, its consistent and universal act of plot construction is what makes its third-person voice appear omniscient. And although Therese temporarily believes that the first-person pronoun increases the authenticity of narrative, her repeated effort to After discovering that the attributes of first-or third-person narration are a product of the stories she tells, Therese begins to pay more attention to the structure of this narrative. Rather than ask whether someone else or she can better tell the story of her life, she asks what structures have made her life alternate between the family story of adaptation and Jean's story of differentiation. As a result, she discovers a "powerful machinery of the family" ( TD, p. 99), of which the family is unaware, which dictates the order in which she told certain stories of her life: "she had acted in obedience to some profound, some inexorable, law. . . . She had not brought destruction on this family: rather it was she who would be destroyed" (TD, p. 99). She has already asserted that, as a child, the family made her a blind accomplice in constructing stories of a shared destiny: "all my thoughts . . . had been equally fitted 'to the road' which my father and my parentsin-law had traced" (TD, p. 65). But she now adds that her life was controlled by a hidden family mechanism whose laws dictated her telling of the story of differentiation, the story with which she justified her apparent attempt to destroy the family's power over her life by poisoning her husband. This mechanism not only produced her story of differentiation, it ultimately repressed it. It now condemns her to be a conscious, but unwilling accomplice in its deceitful act of narration:
"to put on a mask, save face, put them off the scent" ( TD*, p. 136).
The family mechanism described by Therese is a narrative structure since it regulates an interplay between the family's story of adaptation and her story of differentiation. This narrative structure is linear, since it begins in Therese's blind conformity to the family story and ends in a certain knowledge about the process of plot-construction and the error of third-and first-person narration. It tells a story of how narrative creates and demystifies plots and voices, a story of how narrative functions. Therese's greatest insight is to recognize that narrative rather than historical structures dictate the stories with which she has represented her life as a child, a newlywed, and an unhappy wife, and narrative determines the order in which she tells these stories. Her error at this point in the novel is to confuse this narrative structure with a law, one that has a specific denouement: the death of her freedom and the victory of the family story. In other words, her mistake is to reduce her story of how narrative functions to a specific plot. This confusion of a narrative structure with a narrative law, however, must be partially attributed to her family's tyrannical insistence that its members appear to act and speak according to its story, its mandate that they confuse history and narrative.
Therese's narrative structure depends upon a distinction between plot and narrative that is quite unconventional. We usually assume that plot and narrative are synonymous, but in Therese Desqueyroux, where narrative constantly points to its artificial act of plot construction, narrative demystifies the plots it constructs and differentiates itself from these plots. Rather than the laying out of a plot, narrative becomes a process of plot construction and plot demystification, one that alternately identifies narrative with, then distinguishes it from, a specific plot. Therese's narrative of her life, the one she composes before and after she returns home to her husband, consists of three steps: she first traces her complicity in constructing family stories of adaptation according to the plot they deem appropriate; she then demystifies this plot and replaces it with stories of differentiation according to a counter-plot, and she finally demystifies this second plot and replaces it with a third plot describing how narrative structures interweave the first two plots. Clearly, plot here is not simply an arbitrary tool that the critic may or may not use to describe narrative; it is part of the very processes by which Therese composes and interprets her narrative, that is, in reading and writing.
This distinction between plot and narrative is inherent in all narrative, as Paul Ricoeur's reading of Aristotle suggests. If, as he argues, plot-making is a "synthesis of the heterogeneous," then there will always be a difference between the plot that narrative synthesizes and the heterogeneous, narrative elements excluded by that synthesis (Ricoeur, pp. 65-71). Narrative would be constituted by the active processes of constructing plots (by excluding the heterogeneous) and demystifying plots (by bringing out heterogeneous elements that the plot misrepresents). Therese's rebellion against the family story is caused by her awareness of those heterogeneous aspects of her life that the unified plots of Bordeaux society exclude. But her effort to free herself from these plots demonstrates that no narrative can capture the heterogeneity of narrative, the "confused chain" that makes up her life, for rebellion only replaces one false plot with another. Narrative constantly differentiates itself from the plots reading imposes on it, but it can do so only by inducing the reader to misrepresent it in the form of another plot." What makes Therese's narrative structure particularly interesting is that it dictates a process by which narrative differentiates itself, not only from all its plots, but also from first-and third-person voices. It prescribes the transitions between third-and first-person narration that demystify both voices. We have seen that third-person narrators imply first-person narrators to the extent that they can always say "I" (if not necessarily participate in the events they recount), and that first-person narrators imply third-person narrators to the extent that the "I" must always speak about itself as if it were a "she" or "he." But first-and third-person narration are not identical.
There remains a difference between the two, since the "I" points to the act of narration whereas the "she" does not. Although the choice of third-or first-person narration does not render narrative more objective or authentic, transitions between the two do communicate a strong message. The transition from "she" to "I," like heterogeneous elements of the narrative, points to the act of narration, of plot construction. The transition back from first-to third-person narration points in two directions. On the one hand it splits the act of narration (the "I") in two. On the other hand, it points away from the act of narration, and hides its plot construction (Therese must lie). Whereas the transition from third-to first-person narration engenders a process of demystification that distinguishes narrative from plot, the transition back from first-to third-person narration can continue this demystification only by means of a remystification that falsely identifies narrative with plot. This remystification can be lucid, as in the case of Therese, or blind, as in the case of her husband.
The process of demystification, in which transitions between first-and third-person narration disclose that both voices are misleading, is clearly derivative of the more general process by which narrative calls its explicit plots into question. The transitions between voices are meaningful because first-person narration points to the act of narration and third-person narration away from it. But voice is not the only narrative category that can point either to or away from the act of narration, as my discussion of the relationship between plot and the heterogeneous aspects of narrative demonstrates. However, Mauriac's choice to dramatize this more general process through transitions between voices has the particular advantage that it calls into question the very possibility of a truthful, narrative voice. This process only begins with Therese's demystification of third-and firstperson voices. Once she has rejected third-and first-person narration, she discovers the possibility of a more fundamental, narrative voice created by the process of demystification itself, a narrator who would tell the story of this demystification. But since this narrator is created by the process of rejecting first-and third-person narrators, it cannot be identified with either voice. It resembles first-person narrators to the extent that it points to the act of narration, but it resembles third-person narrators to the extent that it differentiates itself from the characters about which it speaks by designating itself as the process that creates these characters. It is thus an implied narrator who speaks for an implied author which would be narrative structure itself. Narrative would be an auto-telic process that tells the story of how it constructs and demystifies its plots. The only correct plot would be an implied one that organizes the story of how narrative was written and how it will be read.
But can this story of how narrative functions be reduced to an implied plot with a beginning, middle, and end? Can narrative tell the true story of its writing and reading when it cannot tell the true story of a character's or narrator's life? The negative thrust uncovered by Therese, narrative's tendency to differentiate itself from all its plots and voices, would suggest that it can only claim to tell the true story of its writing and reading, that the notion of an auto-telic narrative is another narrative illusion. Therese demystifies this last plot at the end of the novel, but does not explain why. Louis, in Le Noeud de viperes, does. He describes how narrative constructs and demystifies the plots with which it represents its writing and reading. It is the rhetorical nature of narrative that invalidates any representation of why it was written or how it will be read. By knowledge of the narrative structures that govern the interplay between the stories he and his family tell: how they construct a story that misrepresents their lives, how this misrepresentation provokes him to tell a counter-story that invalidates the plot of the family story, and how the latter represses this counter-story and reconstructs its own. And like Therese's family, Louis's family attempts to impose its story on the actions of all its members. The only apparent difference between the two "family machineries" is that Louis's family believes its life has a distinctly Christian destiny. His wife and children feel they are charitable beings who are destined not only for social prominence but also for Christian redemption. Louis's attempts to demystify their story of a Christian destiny take the form of a story of their temporal destiny. He tells how they have performed only those acts of charity formally prescribed by the church. This formal charity has lost all meaning: "That charity was synonymous with love was something that you had forgotten, if you ever knew it" ( VT, p. 71). Their lives, he writes his wife, have in fact been filled with acts of vanity and greed, not of true charity.
When Therese discovers the narrative structure that produces and represses her story of rebellion, she renders it comprehensible by reducing it to a linear plot. The narrative of her life, she feels, ends in her realization that her family is totally self-deceived by its story and that she must lie to them about her knowledge. But Louis, a successful litigator, comes to believe that he can teach his family to doubt the stories they tell. Although he knows that his wife and children have consistently refused to listen to his analysis of the family situation, he thinks that he can nonetheless get them to read his written account of it: "you will read these pages to the end. I need to believe it. I do believe it [Je le crois]" ( VT, p. 17; [NDV, p. 21]). Accordingly, he writes his wife a letter, which becomes a sort of diary. Its purpose is to make her aware of the mechanisms that motivate her, her children, and her grandchildren to deceive themselves. This diary, which is to be read after his death, represents a last-ditch effort to communicate through written words what Louis has failed to convey through spoken words during his life.
Louis hypothesizes that the structure dictating how his family provokes and represses dissenting stories is only a surface structure. Although it is unlikely that his wife and children will stop clothing their lives in a story of their Christian destiny or that they will consider his mockery justified, they might nevertheless be taught not to take their story literally. Even if their words are conditioned by a fixed narrative structure, they might learn to distinguish their thoughts and actions from their words. Louis's insight is that the narrative structure regulating the battle between his family's story of a Christian destiny and his story of their search for money and recognition might influence their actions in different ways. This structure might be manipulated so that the family is not doing what it thinks it is doing when it reads the narrative of family life written in his diary. He thus tries to set up a situation in which their attempt to do their duty as defined by the story of their Christian destiny, their attempt to repress his story of their temporal destiny, will force them to read this story: "Even if it is only as a matter of duty, you will read these pages to the end" ( VT, p. 17 ). He calculates that their effort to repress his criticism will force them to face up to it. In this way he would rewrite the plot of the story of his life which until now has ended in his family's refusal to listen to his version of that story.
Since the immediate goal of Louis's diary is to make its readers do the opposite of what they think they are doing, to force them to demystify the Christian plot that they think they are constructing, it is a deceptive and strategic act of narration. It must make its reader, in particular Louis's wife, think that she is performing an act of Christian duty in accordance with Christian dogma, when in fact she is reading statements of how unchristian this performance can be.
The secret of Louis's narrative strategy is the ambiguity of the written, first-person pronoun. As Therese discovered, the "I" points to the act of narration. But if the "I" occurs in a written text, and if it is read after the author has died, then it also becomes a sign of the author's absence. It points to the absent writer's past act of composing his narrative as well as to his wife's present act of narrating what she reads. The written "I" thus splits the reader's present act of narration in two as both a repetition of a dead husband's last words and as an act of narrating his version of family history in the present. This split will put Louis's wife, as his intended reader, into a double bind. On the one hand, if she reads his diary she will be narrating a story that constitutes the last words of her husband. Her act of narration will appear to be virtuous. On the other hand, if she reads it, she will be narrating a story that contradicts her Christian story. Her act of narration will appear to be sinful. The division of the "I" she reads, between the repetition of a past act of narration and the narration of a sinful story, will force her to sin whether or not she reads her Eventually Therese also becomes her own "reader" and realizes that her act of narration is condemned to ambiguity: "Why is it," she asks her husband, "that every story I tell you sounds so false?" ( TD*, p. 178). She listens to her own act of narration in the same way that Louis reads his diary. Le Noeud de viperes situates her problem in a failure to control the process by which narrative represents or misrepresents itself. The consequence of this failure is two radically contradictory readings of what narrative is doing. Either it is a pure act of persuasion or it is an act of expression. Mauriac expresses this ambiguity of the act of narration in the form of two readings of Louis's diary, both written after his death. His son concludes that Louis's diary is a pure act of persuasion: "Lawyer as he was, he was reluctant to lose his case, either in his own eyes, or in ours" ( VT, p. 193). But his granddaughter replies, although she has not been permitted to read her grandfather's diary, that it in fact expresses his conversion: "I would swear that, on this point, the document which you do not want to let me read brings decisive witness" ( VT, p. 199). Mauriac's novel thus leaves its reader with two contradictory readings of its act of narration: one as a prideful effort to persuade the reader to accept Christian doctrine; the other as a humble effort to express a Christian message of humility and love. Because neither Therese nor Louis can choose between contradictory self-representations, neither Therese Desqueyroux nor Le Noeud de viperes can be reduced to a plot that represents how they were written nor predict how they will be read.
Since Louis cannot construct a plot that accurately represents his act of narration, he defines the final transition from the "I" of his diary
to the "he" of his son's and niece's letters as a sign of a much greater alienation than the one described by Therese. Therese discovers that her "I" was a "she" being written by a formal narrative structure. At the end of the novel, she also realizes that her story of how the "family machinery" represses her actions was also misleading. 
